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Pennsylvania's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code ' on
April 6, 1953 has stimulated active study of its provisions by groups
who had little or no hand in its preparation. One study' has disclosed
significant problems concerning the effect of the Code on particular
transactions of importance in the field of banking. It is the purpose of
this article to develop more fully one of the questions raised by this
study. This question relates to the procedure which must be followed
after July 1, 1954 where a loan is secured by an assignment of a real
estate mortgage, of rentals under a lease of real estate, or of an interest
in an estate or trust. It will also discuss the effect of the Code on a
bank's right to apply a customer's deposit balance against his indebted-
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Member of the Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code of the American Bar
Association and the Pennsylvania Bar Association. Chairman of a joint committee
on the Code composed of representatives of the Pennsylvania Bankers Association,
the Philadelphia Clearing House Association and the Pittsburgh Clearing House
Association.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-101 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1953).
2. One study group was originally formed by the Philadelphia Clearing House
Association and, in collaboration with representatives of the Pittsburgh Clearing
House Association and the Pennsylvania Bankers Association, has undertaken the
preparation of a treatise dealing with the effect of the Code on banking operations.
That treatise, Pennsylvania Banks and the Uniform Commercial Code, will be
published by the Pennsylvania Bankers Association, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and
is expected to be ready about May 1, 1954. It was written for laymen and is
primarily intended to serve as a manual and guide to bank officers and employees
in the day to day operations of a commercial bank. However, the interest aroused
by preliminary drafts of this work, which were circulated among certain members
of the bar who are interested in banking operations, has indicated that it may be
of help to lawyers as well as to bank officials.
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ness to the bank, and will suggest certain possible amendments to the
Code which would clarify its treatment of these topics.
The Code represents an ambitious, and it is believed successful,
attempt to systematize the existing chaotic rules regarding the use of
personal property as security for the payment of money or the per-
formance of obligations. A brief description of some of the principal
features of Article 9 must necessarily precede any discussion of the
details of its effect on particular types of transactions.'
In Pennsylvania, as in most other states, a number of security
devices had grown up with little or no logic to support them. Until
comparatively recent times Pennsylvania had been perhaps the most
restricted state in the Union in its recognition of security instruments.
So far as tangible personal property was concerned, it originally recog-
nized, with minor exceptions,4 only two security devices. The first
was the common law pledge, where the creditor had possession of the
goods. The second was the bailment lease. By this fictional device,
used to meet economic necessity, a sale of goods with the reservation
of title as security for the purchase price was upheld against other
creditors of the debtor. After experimenting with certain earlier
forms of conditional sale legislation,' Pennsylvania adopted the Uni-
form Conditional Sales Act in 1925.6 In 1941 it adopted the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act, 7 and in 1945, in order to meet a financing need
that became acute during and at the end of the war, it reversed its
long-settled policy and passed a general chattel mortgage statute.
8
Finally, in 1947, it adopted a factor's lien act similar to those already
in effect in a number of other states, but which has been used rather
rarely 9
Pennsylvania is the first, and so far the only state to adopt the
Uniform Commercial Code. Article 10 of this comprehensive statute
3. Article 9 has been the subject of one recent treatise, and of a number of
law review articles. See BIRNBAUm, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
CommERcIAL CODE (1954) (published by the Committee on Continuing Legal Edu-
cation of the American Law Institute, collaborating with the American Bar As-
sociation). See also, Freedheim and Goldston, Article 9 and Security Interests in
Accounts, Contract Rights and Chattel Paper, 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 69 (1953) ; Birn-
baum, Article 9-A Restatement and Revision of Chattel Security, [19521 Wis. L.
Rxv. 348 (earlier articles cited at 348 n.2) ; Note, Article Nine-Secured Transac-
tions, 22 TENN. L. REV. 848 (1953).
4. For example, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §861 (Purdon 1930), relating to
mortgages of iron ore, pig iron, etc.
5. Pa. Laws 1915, P.L. 866, No. 386, repealed, Pa. Laws 1925, P.L. 603, No.
325, §32; Pa. Laws 1923, P.L. 117, No. 91, repealed, Pa. Laws 1925, P.L. 722,
No. 395, repealed, Pa. Laws 1927, P.L. 979, No. 470, §3.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 361 et seq. (Purdon 1931).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 551 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1953).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 940.1 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1953).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 221 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1953).
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repeals all of the acts mentioned above.'0 In their place it furnishes
a single and relatively simple method of financing personal property,
whether the financing takes the form of a loan or a purchase and sale
transaction. It adopts a completely new approach to the entire subject,
eliminating all distinctions based upon the form in which a transaction
is cast, and adopting a comprehensive system which is non-technical
in nature.
Under the Code the practitioner will no longer have to fear some
of the pitfalls which have been a serious danger in the past. There
is no longer the risk that an instrument purporting to be a bailment
lease will be held a conditional sale 11 because it omits essential terms 12
or contains words inconsistent with a lessor-lessee relationship.'3 Nor
will a chattel mortgage be defective because it is unwitnessed, as was
once required, or unacknowledged, or because it is unaccompanied by a
note or bond.14 If the Code should be adopted in other states, it would
similarly dispense with requirements that must have been a nightmare
to the members of the bars of those jurisdictions, who have seen con-
ditional sale agreements and chattel mortgages held invalid because
the accompanying affidavit had been attached to the contract or mort-
gage by some type of metal fastener rather than written on the instru-
ment itself,"5 or because the affidavit had been taken by an assistant
cashier of a large metropolitan bank instead of by some more senior
officer.16
The requirements of Article 9 of the Code are extremely simple.
Basically, only one of two things is required for the validity, against
creditors, of a "security interest," the term the Code uses instead of the
word "lien." '1 The first alternative requirement is possession, which,
in and of itself, and without the necessity of any written agreement or
the filing of any statement in any public office, is sufficient to give a
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 10-102 (Purdon Supp. 1953).
11. A conditional sale contract is invalid as to creditors if it is not recorded.
In re Robinson, 40 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiarn, 122 F.2d 336 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied sub twin. Bright Brooks Lumber Co. v. Weiss, 314 U.S. 686
(1941).
12. See Kelly Springfield Road Roller Co. v. Spyker, 215 Pa. 332, 64 Atl. 546
(1906); Morgan-Gardner Electric Co. v. Brown, 193 Pa. 351, 44 Adt. 459 (1899).
13. Kennedy-Van Saun Mfg. & Engineering Corp. v. Kinsella, 72 F.2d 338 (3d
Cir. 1934).
14. Witnessing, as well as the requirement of a bond or note, was dispensed
with by the amending act. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 940.2 et seq. (Purdon Supp.
1953). See Arcady Farms Milling Co. v. Sedler, 367 Pa. 314, 80 A2d 845 (1951).
15. In re Chinese Temple Restaurant Co., 54 F.2d 945 (N.D. Ohio 1931);
Columbus Merchandise Co. v. Kline, 248 Fed. 296 (S.D. Ohio 1917).
16. In re Harrison, 109 F. Supp. 614 (D.N.J. 1953).
17. The Code defines "security interest" as "an interest in property which
secures payment or performance of an obligation." UNIFORM COMER cIAL CODE
§ 1-201(37) (Official Draft 1952) (hereinafter UCC).
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creditor or other secured party a security interest which will be valid
against other creditors of his debtor."8 Such a security interest is called
by the Code a "perfected security interest." "I As an alternative to
possession, the Code provides for the execution of a written security
agreement 2 0 and, in addition, provides in most cases for the filing of
a financing statement 2 ' in the office of the Secretary of the Common-
wealth or of the local prothonotary, or both,2 or in the case of goods
affixed or to be affixed to realty, in the office of the recorder of deeds.'
The formal requirements of both the security agreement and the financ-
ing statment are so simple that it is difficult to believe that anyone will
suffer through his inability to comply with them.
No system, of course, can provide identical treatment for every
situation which may arise and Article 9 does provide variations of pro-
cedure. However, these variations do not depend on the type of writ-
ing that is executed. Thus the procedure to be followed does not de-
pend upon whether the parties enter into a bailment lease or a chattel
mortgage, as has been the case in the past, but upon the nature of the
personal property with which the parties are dealing. Accordingly,
the Code divides personal property into two broad categories, tangible
property and intangible property, and subdivides each of these into a
number of classes.
CLASSIFICATION OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
Tangible personal property is referred to as "goods" 24 and is
subdivided into four classes. The first is "consumer goods," which
are goods used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or
household purposes.5 The second category is "equipment," which
consists of goods used or bought for use primarily in a business, in
farming or in a profession."' For example, the machine tools of a
manufacturer, the library of a university, or the desks and chairs of
a governmental office all would constitute equipment under the Code.
The third category is "farm products," which consist of crops or live-
18. UCC §§9-203(1) (a), 9-305(1). The Code makes an exception to this rule
where goods are stored under a field warehousing or similar arrangement on the
debtor's premises. UCC § 9-305 (2).
19. UCC § 9-303.
20. UCC §9-203(1) (b).
21. UCC §9-302.
22. UCC §§ 9-401 (1) (a), 9-401(1) (b).
23. UCC §9-401(1) (c).
24. UCC §9-105(1) (f).
25. UCC § 9-109(1).
26. UCC §9-109(2). Goods used by a nonprofit organization or governmental
subdivision or agency are also "equipment."
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stock used or produced in farming operations and certain other prod-
ucts in their unmanufactured states, such as gin cotton, wool clip, maple
syrup, milk, and eggs, provided these products are in the possession of
a debtor from whose farming operations they derive or in which they
are used.17 Finally, there is a fourth category called "inventory,"
which includes raw materials, work in process, finished products held
for sale, and also materials used or consumed in a business, such as
maintenance, repair and operating supplies. 8
There will be times when it may be difficult to determine into
which category under the Code certain tangible personal property
should be placed. A physician's automobile might be either "con-
sumer goods" or "equipment," depending on whether it is used pri-
marily for his family or for his practice.. Similarly, it is obvious at
once that a particular item of personal property may change from
category to category as it passes from a manufacturer to a dealer and
from him to the ultimate user. For example, a refrigerator is part of
the "inventory" of the person who manufactures it or the dealer who
holds it for sale. If it is purchased for use in a commercial establish-
ment, it becomes "equipment." If, instead, it is bought for installation
in a householder's kitchen, it becomes "consumer goods." These dif-
ferences must be taken into account in dealing with the same item of
property as it moves from one category to another.
However, no serious problems of coverage arise with respect to
tangible personal property, for it is clear from the definition of "goods"
that this kind of property is completely subdivided into four subclasses,
leaving no residue. 9  While it may be difficult in a few situations to
decide into which class a particular article falls at a given moment, such
borderline cases are inevitable. Furthermore, the parties have only a
limited choice and wherever they are doubtful into which category the
goods fall, they can take whatever action may be required with respect
to each of the classes. For instance, there may be situations where it
is doubtful whether certain goods being sold on an installment basis
constitute "equipment" or "consumer goods." If they are the former,
a financing statement should be filed; 80 whereas, if they are the latter,
none is required." The creditor in this situation can readily protect
himself by filing as a matter of precaution, even though it may later
27. UCC §9-109(3).
28. UCC § 9-109(4).
29. This is because of the catchall phrase of 11CC § 9-109(2) which classifies
as "equipment" all goods not included within the definition of the other three
categories. UCC § 9-109(2).
30. UCC §9-302(1).
31. UCC § 9-302(1) (d).
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be decided that filing was unnecessary. Similarly, questions may arise
as to where the filing should take place. It may be doubtful whether
an item constitutes "farm products" or "inventory." If it is the former,
only filing with the local prothonotary is necessary; 32 but if it is the
latter, there should be filing in the office of the Secretary of the Com-
monwealth and possibly in the office of the prothonotary as well. In
such a case the creditor should undoubtedly file in both offices.
CLASSIFICATION OF INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
When intangible personal property is considered, however, more
difficulties arise. The Code provides for five subdivisions of intan-
gibles: "instruments," "documents," "chattel paper," "accounts,"
and "contract rights." In this field the draftsmen of the Code do not
seem to have covered the entire field of intangible property and not
only are there important subjects of financing whose classification is
doubtful as between two or more of the defined categories, but there
are other subjects which do not seem to fall into any category at all.
This would not be serious if Section 9-102 did not lay down the rule
that Article 9 applies, ". . . to any transaction (regardless of its form)
which is intended to create a security interest in personal property
." except as provided in Section 9-104.".
INSURANCE POLICIES AS COLLATERAL
Certain events which occurred in the spring of 1953 illustrate the
difficulties encountered in attempting to fit all intangible personal prop-
erty into the five categories provided by the Code. Soon after the Code
was passed, there arose the question of the status of a policy of insur-
ance which was used as collateral for a loan. 5 One of the crucial ques-
32. UCC §9-401(1)(b).
33. UCC §9-401(1) (a).
34. UCC § 9-104 originally provided:
"This Article does not apply
(a) to a security interest subject to the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920, or any
other statute of the United States to the extent that such statute regu-
lates the rights of parties to and third parties affected by transactions
in particular types of property; or
(b) to a landlord's lien or a lien on real estate; or
(c) to a lien given by statute or other rule of law for services or materials
except as provided in Section 9-310 on priority of such liens; or
(d) to an assignment or other transfer of a claim for wages, salary or other
compensation of an employee; or
(e) to an equipment trust covering railway rolling stock; or
(f) to a transfer of accounts as part of a sale of the business out of which
they arose, or a transfer of a contract right to an assignee who is also
to do the performance under the contract."
35. The question had actually been raised earlier, at a panel discussion at the
mid-winter meeting of the Pennsylvania Bar Association on January 16, 1953, but
its importance was not then fully perceived, and the matter was not pressed.
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tions was whether delivery of the insurance policy to the creditor per-
fected his security interest, or whether public filing was required. The
Code provided that security interests in "documents," "chattel paper"
and "instruments" could be perfected by delivery of the writing30 On
the other hand, security interests in "accounts" and "contract rights"
were to be perfected by public filing.
7
Clearly, an insurance policy was neither "chattel paper" 8 nor a
"document." 9 It did not qualify as an "account." " Since it was
neither a security 41 nor a negotiable instrument,' the only remaining
categories which might include an insurance policy were, "any other
writing" within the definition of "instrument" I or "contract right." 4'
If an insurance policy was a "contract right" rather than an "in-
strument," a financing statement would have to be filed whenever the
policy was used as collateral security for a loan, a result which the
draftsmen of the Code had certainly never contemplated. There
seemed no question how the draftsmen of the Code intended an insur-
ance policy to be treated. Comment 4 to Section 9-105 45 stated:
"4. "Instrument' (subsectiom (1) (g)): the term as defined
includes not only negotiable instruments and investment securi-
ties but also other intangibles which are evidenced by writings
which are in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery,
36. UCC § 9-305.
37. UCC § 9-302.
38. "'Chattel paper' means a security agreement or lease of a type which is
in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with appropriate indorsement
or assignment. When a transaction is evidenced both by chattel paper and by an
instrument or a series of instruments, the group of writings taken together con-
stitutes chattel paper. . . ." UCC § 9-105(b).
39. "'Documents' means documents of title . ." UCC §9-105(e).
40. "'Account' means a right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services
rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper...." UCC
§ 9-106.
41. UCC § 8-102.
42. UCC § 3-104.
43. "'Instrument' means a negotiable instrument (defined in Section 3-104),
or a security (defined in Section 8-102) or any other writing not itself a security
agreement or lease which evidences a right to the payment of money and is of a type
which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery. When a transaction
is evidenced both by chattel paper and by an instrument or a series of instruments,
the group of writings taken together constitutes chattel paper. .. "
44. ". . . 'Contract right' means any right to payment under a contract not
yet earned by performance and not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper.
A right to wages, salary or other compensation of an employee or a right repre-
sented by a judgment is neither a 'contract right' nor an 'account'." UCC § 9-106.
45. Most of the sections of the Code as published by its sponsors are followed
by comments discussing various phases of the problem dealt with by the particular
section. The Code provides in section 1-102(3) (f) : "The Comments of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Insti-
tute may be consulted in the construction and application of this Act but if text
and comment conflict, text controls. .. "
1954]
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for example, insurance policies. As in the case of chattel paper
'delivery' is only the minimum stated and may be accompanied
by other steps."
However, it was by no means clear that they had carried out their
intention. This comment showed that the draftsmen of the Code re-
garded an insurance policy as an "instrument," under the portion of
the definition of that term which speaks of "any other writing .
which evidences a right to the payment of money." If the draftsmen
had stopped at this point there would have been no difficulty. Unfor-
tunately, they added the words "and is of a type which is in ordinary
course of business transferred by delivery." Did this mean transferred
by delivery alone, as in the case of a bearer security? It was noted that
in the definition of "chattel paper," the draftsmen had spoken of "a
type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery
with approprtate indorsement or assignment" (Italics added). Law-
yers were puzzled by the omission of anything corresponding to the
words "with appropriate indorsement or assignment" in the definition
of "instrument." This omission raised a question in their minds as
to whether an insurance policy, which upon transfer is normally deliv-
ered to the transferee but which is also normally accompanied by a
written assignment, met that definition, and whether various other in-
tangibles, such as real estate bonds and mortgages, leases of real estate,
and nonnegotiable commercial paper, likewise did so. It seemed pos-
sible that there was a real conflict between the text and Comment 4.
Counsel for one of the largest life insurance companies in Penn-
sylvania raised this problem with the sponsors of the Code soon after
its approval by the Governor.48  He pointed out the doubt that existed
as to whether a life insurance policy really was an "instrument" and
if not, whether it was a "contract right," showing that it really did not
fit happily under the definition of either of these terms. He suggested
that if an insurance policy was an "instrument," then under the Code
a person making a loan on the security of the policy would be required
to obtain possession of it in order to have a perfected security interest,
and that while this presented no practical difficulty where the loan was
being made by a bank or other third party lender, it might cause in-
convenience where the loan was being made to the policyholder by the
insurance company itself,47 since in this situation it was not the prac-
46. Unpublished memorandum by Willis H. Satterthwaite, Counsel, Penn Mutual
Life Insurance Company, ASSIGNMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES UNDER THE
UNIFORm COMMERCIAL CODE (May 2, 1953).
47. The author of the memorandum believed that the so-called policy loan is no
loan at all, but rather an advance, to be charged against subsequent amounts due
by the company if not repaid. He argued that the insurance company in fact holds
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tice of certain insurance companies to insist on the policy being deliv-
ered to or retained by them. On the other hand, he pointed out that
if an insurance policy was a "contract right," rather than an "instru-
ment," a financing statement would have to be filed and certain other
undesirable consequences would follow which were never contemplated
by the draftsmen of the Code. He suggested several amendments to
Article 9, one of which would have changed Section 9-105 (g) so as
to read:
"(g) 'Instrument' means . . or any other writing
which evidences a right to the payment of money and is of a type
which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery
or by delivery with appropriate indorsement or assignment."
The sponsors of the Code recognized the merit of at least part of
the criticisms that had been submitted. It was decided, however, to
meet the problem by excluding insurance policies entirely from the
scope of Article 9, rather than by changing any of its definitions. Ac-
cordingly, the legislature amended 4 ' section 9-104 by adding a new
subparagraph so that it now reads:
"Section 9-104. Transactions Excluded From Article.
This article does not apply
"(g) to an assignment or other transfer of an interest or
claim in or under any policy of insurance."
While this disposed of the immediate problem of insurance poli-
cies, it still leaves the other problems of classification unsolved. The
most important single category is the real estate bond and mortgage
when it is used as collateral security for a loan.
BONDS AND MORTGAGES AS COLLATERAL SECURITY
In recent years, mortgage companies have increasingly engaged in
the practice of borrowing from banks on the security of the newly cre-
ated mortgages, prior to selling the bonds and mortgages to insurance
companies and other investors.
No difficulty under Article 9 arises when a mortgage is originally
created. Article 9 does not apply to real estate 49 or to a lien on real
no "collateral," and thai its interest in the policy is not in reality a security interest.
Nevertheless, the possibility existed that some court might look upon the transaction
differently.
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §9-104(g) (Purdon Supp. 1954) (Act No. 180,
July 27, 1953).
49. UCC § 9-102.
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estate."' Therefore, when an owner of real estate borrows money and
executes a bond and warrant of attorney in the usual Pennsylvania
form, and a mortgage on his land, Article 9 has no application. Nor
does the Code come into play if the mortgagee makes an outright sale
of the mortgage to some other person, since such a sale does not create
a security interest in the bond or mortgage. All rights under them
pass from the original mortgagee to the assignee and the mortgagee
retains no right of redemption or other interest of any kind. But, as
noted, frequently the mortgagee or the subsequent owner of a bond
and mortgage wishes to use it as collateral security for a loan. In the
past this has been a simple transaction, which was usually carried out
by the execution and delivery of a collateral note evidencing the money
loaned and an assignment of the bond and mortgage to the lender, and
by the recording of the assignment in the office of the recorder of
deeds.5'
Can the transaction still be handled under the Code as it was in the
past? The answer is doubtful. The same factors which made for
uncertainty in the case of an insurance policy are still present. There
is no difficulty about the mortgage itself. That is not subject to Ar-
ticle 9, either because it is not personal property or because it is a lien
on real estate. 2  The trouble arises in connection with the chose in
action, that is, the debt which the mortgage secures, and which is evi-
denced by the bond of the mortgagor.58 This mortgage bond is clearly
personal property " irrespective of the nature of the mortgage itself;
50. UCC § 9-104(b).
51. The recording of assignments of mortgages is governed by PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, §623 (Purdon 1930), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§623-1,
623-4 (Purdon Supp. 1953). Recording is usually omitted, for practical reasons,
where large numbers of mortgages are being assigned as collateral for short term
loans from a bank to a mortgage company.
52. See Lloyd, The Mortgage Theory of Pennsylvania, 73 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 43
(1924).
53. "A mortgage is a secondary-not a primary obligation. It is merely col-
lateral security for a debt, and, without a debt, there usually can be no valid and
enforceable mortgage. It was the debt owing by Michael Miller to this decedent
that was intended to be appraised and not Michael Miller's real estate. The mort-
gage was collateral security for the payment of this debt. The debt was the bond
accompanying the mortgage." Miller's Estate, 54 York Legal Rec. 133, 139 (Pa.
C.P. 1940).
54. McGlathery's Estate, 311 Pa. 351, 166 Atl. 886 (1933). "Personal property,
generally speaking, means, it is true, everything except real estate, and 'all my
personal property' likewise would mean in general all the personal property of the
testatrix which she owned at the date of her death. If the will therefore had
simply given 'all my personal property' to Gertrude Graves, she would undoubtedly
have been entitled to the Asbury Park mortgages, or rather the interest of the
testatrix therein. . . ." Id. at 354, 166 Atl. at 887. The court, however, decided
that later specific references in the will to jewelry, clothing and money showed
that the testatrix did not intend to include the Asbury Park mortgage within the
term "personal property" in that particular instance.
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and the pledge of the bond as security for a loan is a transaction which
is intended to create a "security interest in personal property," and
hence falls within the basic test for the applicability of Article 9. But
is filing dispensed with by delivery of the bond on the ground that it is
an "instrument"? " The bond is a writing which evidences a right
to the payment of money, and it is neither a security agreement 5 6 nor
a lease. To this extent it falls within the definition of "instrument."
But is it of a type which in ordinary course of business is transferred
by delivery, which is one of the statutory requirements? The answer
to this depends, as it did in the case of the insurance policy prior to the
amendment of Section 9-104, upon the answer to another question:
does delivery mean delivery alone, or delivery plus something else,
namely, the execution and delivery of an assignment of the bond
and mortgage?
If we assume for the moment that a mortgage bond is not an
instrument, then in what category does it fall? The only other defined
term in Article 9 which might apply to it is "contract right," which is
defined as "any right to payment under a contract not yet earned by
performance and not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper.
'57
But what is the performance which has not yet been earned by the
mortgagee? It seems at least as difficult to fit the mortgage bond into
the category of "contract right" as into the category of "instrument."
This question of classification is of practical importance. If the mort-
gage bond is an "instrument," the lender can obtain a perfected security
interest in it merely by taking it into his possession,-" and this is the
only way by which he can obtain a perfected interest for a period of
more than twenty-one days. 9 On the other hand, if the bond is noth-
ing but a "contract right," possession of the writing becomes imma-
terial, and a perfected security interest can be obtained only by the filing
of a financing statement."0
Informal discussion of this problem with proponents of the Code
has produced several responses. It has been suggested that real estate
bonds and mortgages are not "instruments," "documents," "chattel
paper," "accounts" or "contract rights ;" and hence are not subject to
Article 9 at all. But this approach overlooks the very broad provi-
55. For the definition of "instrument" see note 43 supra.
56. A security agreement is defined as an agreement which creates or provides
for a security interest. UCC § 9-105 (1) (h). A mortgage bond is a promise, which
is void if certain conditions are fulfilled. It does not of itself create or provide for
any security interest in the mortgaged property.
57. UCC § 9-106.
58. UCC § 9-305.
59. UCC § 9-304.
60. UCC § 9-302.
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sions of Section 9-102, which makes Article 9 applicable to all per-
sonal property used as collateral. Irrespective of the nature of a mort-
gage, either as real estate or as a lien on real estate,6' certainly the debt
which the mortgage secures is personal property in which a security
interest is being created.' It has also been argued that the assignment
of a real estate bond and mortgage as security for a loan is not a "com-
mercial transaction," and hence is not within the scope of the Code
under any circumstances; and that to apply the Code to such a transac-
tion would be inconsistent with its underlying purposes and policies,'
and would violate Article 3, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion, 4 since the Code's title is "An Act Relating to Certain Commercial
Transactions in or regarding Personal Property . . ." It is true
that bonds and mortgages may be assigned many times in transactions
which cannot be regarded as commercial. But this is not always the
case; and certainly when a commercial bank makes a loan to a customer
and takes as collateral an assignment of a bond and mortgage which
that customer owns, a situation which is by no means rare, the transac-
tion can readily be regarded as a commercial one.
Therefore, as long as the possibility exists that a mortgage bond
may be held to be a "contract right," there is the corresponding dan-
ger that a lender who takes such a bond and the accompanying mort-
gage as security for a loan and who merely follows its past practice of
obtaining and recording an assignment of the bond and mortgage will
be held to have an unperfected security interest in the bond. This will
be vulnerable against the borrower's creditors or his trustee in bank-
ruptcy; ' and if the lender's rights in the bond are subordinate to those
of other persons, its rights in the mortgage may be subordinate as well.
Lawyers for banks and other institutions lending on the security of
bonds and mortgages may therefore feel compelled to advise their
clients to take the multiple precautions of obtaining an assignment of
the bond and mortgage, taking possession of the mortgage papers, and
in addition filing a financing statement in the office of the Secretary of
the Commonwealth, and in most instances in that of the local prothon-
otary as well. The alternative is to use a negotiable note instead of the
customary bond, since there is no question about the status of such a
note as an "instrument."
61. Lloyd, supra note 52.
62. McGlathery's Estate, 311 Pa. 351, 354, 166 Atl. 886, 887 (1933).
63. See UCC § 1-102.
64. PA. CoNsw. Art. 3, § 3: "No bill . . . shall be passed containing more
than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title."
65. UCC § 9-301.
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But the filing of a financing statement in connection with the
transfer of a real estate bond and mortgage seems never to have been
contemplated by the draftsmen of the Code and it will add nothing to
the benefit received by the business community through public notice,
since the assignment of the mortgage will be recorded in any event. 6
It therefore seems highly probable that the Pennsylvania courts will
find some method of carrying out the intention of the draftsmen by
treating mortgage bonds as "instruments." They can readily do so by
ignoring the difference between the words "of a type which is in ordi-
nary course of business transferred by delivery with appropriate in-
dorsement or assignment," which are used in the definition of "chattel
paper," 67 and the words "of a type which is in ordinary course of
business transferred by delivery" in the definition of "instrument." 08
Or they can say that the draftsmen of the Code did intend to draw a
distinction, but that they realized that chattel paper is almost always
transferred both by delivery and by either indorsement or assignment,
and hence that in order to qualify as "chattel paper" a writing must
satisfy both of these requirements; whereas, to qualify as an "instru-
ment" the writing must meet the requirement of delivery but need not
necessarily meet the requirement of indorsement or assignment.
Nevertheless, it would seem highly desirable to remove the doubt
which exists by an amendment to the definition of "instrument." This
should be possible in 1955, and might take the form of the wording sug-
gested by the insurance companies which has been quoted above, 9
or the wording: "Instrument" means . . . any other writing . .
which evidences a right to the payment of money and is of a type which
is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with or with-
out appropriate indorsement or assignment.70
SECURITY INTERESTS IN RENTS
Another type of property which is sometimes used as security
for a loan is money payable as rent under a lease of real estate. Here
again the Code leaves in doubt the proper treatment of such a trans-
66. Except in the case of the so-called "warehousing" or "field warehousing" of
mortgages, where a bank makes a revolving credit arrangement with a mortgage
company, and takes as collateral the mortgages which the latter is holding for sale
to institutional investors.
67. See note 38 supra.
68. See note 43 supra.
69. See text following note 47 supra.
70. This proposal, however, will not solve the problem of a bank which is
making loans secured by numerous mortgages, and which because of their volume,
does not wish to record individual assignments.
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action. Literally interpreted, it classifies the lease of the real estate
as "chattel paper," since that term is defined as "a security agreement
or lease of a type which is in ordinary course of business trans-
ferred by delivery with appropriate indorsement or assignment... ." , 71
Furthermore, a "lease" is excluded from the definition of "instru-
ment." 72 It seems highly doubtful, however, that the draftsmen of the
Code intended these clauses to be interpreted literally and to apply to
all leases, including leases of real estate. Probably they were thinking
only of leases of personal property such as bailment and other chattel
leases.73 Nevertheless, a real estate lease and the rent payable under
it are both personal property, and therefore within the broad scope of
Article 9, and some classification should be provided for them.74
If the lease falls within the category of "chattel paper," then the
filing of a financing statement is not required for the perfection of a
security interest, provided the assignee of the rentals takes possession
of the written lease itself.7 Similarly, if the lease is treated as an
"instrument," no filing is required.76  However, its inclusion within
the term "instrument" is subject to the same doubts as those already
expressed as to mortgage bonds, plus the additional doubt caused by
the reference to "lease" in the definition of "instrument." 77 Al-
though an "account" includes the "right to payment for goods .
leased," a real estate lease clearly does not fall within this definition.
The inclusion of a lease, or the moneys payable under it, in the category
of "contract right" would require the filing of a financing statement; 78
but this classification is dubious. It would therefore seem desirable,
in addition to amending the definition of "instrument" as suggested
above, also to clarify the classification problem by specifically pro-
viding that the word "lease," as used in the definitions of "chattel
paper" and "instrument," does or does not include a lease of real es-
tate. There seems to be little choice as to which alternative should
71. UCC §9-105(1) (b) (Italics added).
72. UCC §9-105 (1) (g).
73. UCC §9-102(2) refers to a "bailment-lease" and "a lease intended as
security." Probably only these are the leases referred to in UCC § 9-105(b) and
(f). An earlier draft was clear that only a lease of goods fell within the category
of chattel paper. See September 1949 Revisions, UCC § 8-106, comment 4. But
"prior drafts of text and comments may not be used to ascertain legislative intent."
UCC § 1-102(3) (g).
74. "A lease for years is only a chattel, or, as it is called, a chattel real; it is
personal not real estate.... ".Shaeffer v. Baeringer, 346 Pa. 32, 34, 29 A.2d 697,
698 (1943).
75. UCC §9-305(1).
76. UCC §9-305(1).
77. UCC § 9-106.
78. UCC § 9-302.
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be adopted.79 The important thing is to eliminate the uncertainty,
which leaves a possibility that a real estate lease is neither "chattel
paper" nor an "instrument," and hence is either a "contract right" or a
type of intangible property for which the Code makes no specific pro-
vision. Until some change is made in the language of section 9-105
it may be necessary, as a matter of precaution, for a person lending
money on the security of an assignment of rentals of real estate not
only to obtain a written instrument of assignment and to give notice
to the tenant, but also to file a financing statement in the appropriate
offices.
INTERESTS IN TRUSTS OR IN DECEDENTS' ESTATES AS COLLATERAL
Still another type of collateral which is sometimes assigned to a
bank or other lending institution as collateral for a loan is an interest
in the estate of a decedent or an interest in a trust created by will or
inter vivos deed of trust. Such interests should in many or perhaps
all cases be classified as personal property rather than as real estate,
and hence would appear to fall within the broad scope of Section 9-102.
Nevertheless, they are not embraced in any of the categories of in-
tangible personal property established by Article 9 and it seems doubtful
whether any thought was given to them in the drafting of that article.
Accordingly, the appropriate method of handling such an assignment
after July 1, 1954, is in doubt. Can the lender safely rely merely on
the steps which he would have taken prior to that date in a similar
case, such as the execution of a written assignment and notice to the
personal representative, trustee or other fiduciary? o It would seem
unsafe for him to do so, and thereby run the risk at least of litigation
if the borrower's creditors should attack the transaction, claiming that
the lender had obtained only an unperfected security interest. Prob-
ably, therefore, most lenders will insist upon the filing of a financing
statement. Yet this type of transaction seems to fall outside the in-
tended scope of Article 9, which was meant to cover everyday com-
mercial transactions; and it would seem desirable therefore to amend
Section 9-104 so as to exclude specifically from Article 9 an assign-
ment or other transfer of an interest in or claim under any decedent's
estate or any trust established under a will or deed of trust.
79. If a real estate lease is "chattel paper," a lender can obtain a perfected
security interest in it by filing a financing statement, even though the lease is left
in the possession of the borrower, under UCC § 9-308; if it is an "instrument,"
possession is essential if the perfected security interest is to last for more than
twenty-one days. UCC §9-304(1).
80. Phillips's Estate (No. 3), 205 Pa. 515, 55 AtI. 213 (1903).
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JUDGMENTS AS COLLATERAL
Occasionally, the holder of a judgment will wish to use it as
collateral for a loan. If the judgment is a lien on real estate, Article
9 does not apply to it.81 But conceivably the judgment might be
merely a claim against a solvent defendant, and therefore acceptable
as collateral, without being a lien on any real property. The Code
leaves in doubt the proper method of obtaining a perfected security
interest in such a judgment. Normally the lender would take an
assignment, and an order to mark the judgment to his use on the
docket, which he would then file with the prothonotary of the court
where the judgment had been entered, and would notify the defendant
to make further payments to the lender as assignee. Under the Code
it becomes questionable whether this is sufficient, or whether in addi-
tion a financing statement must be filed.
BANK DEPOSITS AS COLLATERAL FOR BANK LOANS
Finally, there is one other area of some importance where the
Code seems deficient and where banks are vitally concerned. This is
the use of deposit balances as security for moneys which a bank may
lend. Many notes and agreements used by banks contain a provision
that the bank is given a lien upon the deposit balance of the maker
of the note as security for all of the maker's obligations to the bank.
The use of the lien concept is unnecessary in a number of situa-
tions. If the note is payable on demand, the bank has a right of set-
off under the Defalcation Act, 2 which it can ordinarily exercise at any
time, even without notice to the maker of the note. 3 Furthermore,
even in the case of a time instrument, if the maker becomes a bankrupt
in ordinary proceedings, the Bankruptcy Act itself gives the bank a
right of set-off."4 On the other hand, if the bank holds a time instru-
ment which has not matured, the bank normally has no right to seize
its customer's deposit balance. 5 It can obtain such a right only by
way of contract, and the Pennsylvania courts have enforced such agree-
ments on the theory that the bank has a "lien" on its depositor's ac-
81. UCC §9-104(b).
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 601 (Purdon Supp. 1953).
83. Aarons v. Public Service B. & L. Ass'n, 318 Pa. 113, 178 At. 141 (1935);
Adolph Bergman B. & L. Ass'n v. Blaul, 318 Pa. 126, 178 Atl. 140 (1935).
84. 30 STAT. 565 (1898), as amended, 52 STAT. 878 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §108
(1946). An exception to this general rule exists where the depositor is in reorgani-
zation proceedings under Chapter X. Susquehanna Chemical Corp. v. Producers
Bank & Trust Co., 174 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1949).
85. Kurtz v. County National Bank, 288 Pa. 472, 136 Atl. 789 (1927); Blum
Bros. v. Girard National Bank, 248 Pa. 148, 93 Atl. 940 (1915).
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count. 6  For example, in Southwark National Bank v. Beck,8 7 the
Pennsylvania Superior Court said:
"It has been uniformly held by our Supreme Court that the
general rule is that demands, such as bank deposits, cannot be
appropriated in satisfaction of unmatured debts, when death in-
tervenes, or an assignment for the benefit of creditors has been
filed, or receivers in bankruptcy selected, for all creditors have
the right to share equally in the assets. . . . But a creditor
may avoid the effect of this rule and protect himself by a con-
tract with his debtor under which the former shall have a lien
upon any fund in his hands belonging to the latter, or the right
to appropriate the fund, or any part thereof, under fixed condi-
tions, to the payment of a debt not due. This right of a bank to
protect itself by such a contract was recognized by our Supreme
Court in the Kurtz case and in Blum Bros. v. Girard National
Bank, 248 Pa. 148, and Thompson v. Hazlewood Savings &
Trust Co., 234 Pa. 452.
"In the case before us such a contract was made. While
that contract did not expressly state that the bank had a lien on
the deposit for the payment of the note, it did provide for the
acceleration of the maturity of that obligation in the event of the
death of the depositor, and that the deposit should immediately be-
come the subject of setoff against any indebtedness due or to be-
come due by the depositor and might at all times be held and
appropriated by the bank to the payment of all notes of the de-
positor, matured or unmatured. In our view the agreement
amounted to a pledge of the deposit and gave the plaintiff a lien
thereon.
How will a Pennsylvania court treat this problem after July 1,
1954? The rule as to demand obligations seems to be unchanged by
the Code. The bank's right will still depend on the Defalcation Act.88
Likewise, the Bankruptcy Act will still control where the maker of the
note becomes bankrupt and the bank may normally exercise its right
of set-off in this situation, whether its note has matured or is payable
on demand or at some future date. However, in a situation where
neither the Defalcation Act nor the Bankruptcy Act applies, but where
the bank has an agreement with its depositor that it may apply his
deposit balance at any time, and hence has a contractual lien on that
balance, it would seem that under the Code the bank has a security
interest in the deposit account and that that security interest is subject
to all the terms of Article 9. But in what category does the deposit
86. See Thompson v. Hazlewood Savings & Trust Co., 234 Pa. 452, 83 AtI.
284 (1912).
87. 98 Pa. Super. 213 (1930).
88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 601 (Purdon Supp. 1953).
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account fall? Here again the Code seems to be completely silent on
the subject. None of the five categories of intangible personal prop-
erty seems to include the deposit balance and therefore the right of
the bank to apply this balance prior to the maturity of a time note
may be questioned, unless the bank has filed a financing statement.
The filing of such a statement would seem to be sufficient to protect
the bank even though it is not possible to place the deposit account
in any particular category. 9
Banks will probably be reluctant to ask their customers to take
this step; and their customers may well be unwilling to sign financing
statements which specifically pledge their deposit balances to the bank,
if the latter requests them to do so, even though the same customers
have for years been signing without question printed notes and other
agreements which contained a clause providing for a bankers' lien.
Probably few customers read the finely printed clauses of the typical
collateral note.
One alternative measure which banks can use to protect them-
selves is to include very broad acceleration clauses " in their notes,
because it seems likely that if a time note has matured through the
occurrence of an accelerating event, the bank's right of set-off under
the Defalcation Act will immediately come into play, and that the
court will treat the note as though it were payable on demand. Some
doubt may be cast on this proposition by the case of Schiff v. Schind-
ler,9 where the Superior Court denied the bank's right of set-off under
such circumstances. At the time that case was decided, however,
Pennsylvania had not yet recognized the right of a bank to exercise
its right of set-off even where it held a demand note, if it had not taken
some action to apply the maker's deposit balance prior to the time
some adverse claim to the deposit balance was asserted. This question
soon came before the Superior Court in the case of Valiant Co. v.
Pleasonton . Pa. Co."- The right to set-off was denied, and this
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in a
per curiam opinion." Subsequently, Valiant Co. v. Pleasonton , Pa.
Co. was overruled by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the Aarons
case,94 where the court adopted the view that the rights of the claimant
89. UCC § 9-302.
90. Although the limitations on acceleration clauses provided by UCC § 1-208
do not constitute serious obstacles, they must be taken into account in drafting any
such clauses.
91. 98 Pa. Super. 207 (1930).
92. 108 Pa. Super. 197, 164 Atl. 143 (1933).
93. Valiant Co. v. Pleasonton & Pa. Co., 311 Pa. 587, 167 Atl. 330 (1933).
94. Aarons v. Public Service B. & L. Ass'n, 318 Pa. 113, 178 Atl. 141 (1935).
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to the deposit balance, in that case an attaching creditor, could rise no
higher than those of the depositor himself, and that since as against the
depositor the bank's right of set-off was unquestionable, the bank had
the same right against the attaching creditor. It is believed that the
court which decided the Aarons case would probably have reached the
opposite result from the Superior Court in Schiff v. Schindler. If so,
a bank holding a time instrument can probably exercise its right of
set-off immediately upon the happening of an accelerating event and
need not fall back upon any lien theory in order to apply its cus-
tomer's deposit balance.
Nevertheless, it would seem desirable for the Code specifically to
cover this situation in some way. It is not believed that the drafts-
men intended to change or affect any of the rules regarding set-off,
and it would therefore seem appropriate to amend Section 9-104 and
to provide that Article 9 shall not apply to any security interest which
a bank may have in the deposit balances of its own customers.
CLASSIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE 9 IN MASSACHUSETTS
In 1953 the Uniform Commercial Code was referred by the Massa-
chusetts legislature to a special commission for the purpose of making
an investigation and study. 5 The commission recently filed its report,
in which, by a vote of six to three, it recommended that the Code be
enacted.9" Attached to the report is the text of the Code as proposed
for introduction. While it is almost identical with the Code as adopted
in Pennsylvania, it differs in two respects which are of particular inter-
est in connection with the problems discussed above.
In addition to the five categories of intangible personal property
found in the Pennsylvania Code, the Massachusetts bill provides for a
sixth category, "general intangibles," which it defines as "intangibles
other than accounts or contract rights and other than chattel paper,
documents or instruments." 97 It requires the filing of a financing
statement in the office of the state secretary in order to perfect a se-
curity interest in general intangibles."8 It also provides that Article 9
does not apply "to a right represented by a judgment." "
This last change is an excellent one for Pennsylvania to adopt.
However, the creation of a sixth category of "general intangibles" in
Pennsylvania would seem to create more problems than it would solve.
95. MASSACHUSETTS, ACTS AND RESOLvES OF 1953, c. 61.
96. Report of the Special Commission to Investigate and Study the Uniform
Commercial Code. MAss. H.R. REP. No. 2400, 1953.
97. MAss. H.R. 1928, § 9-106.
98. MASS. H.R. 1928, §§ 9-302, 9-401(d).
99. MASS. H.R. 192-8, § 9-104(d).
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True, it would close the gap which now exists in the treatment of in-
tangible personal property. But it would further confuse the problem
arising in the case of mortgage bonds and leases, by providing still
another class into which they might fall; and it would clearly include
interests in estates and trusts, and bank deposits, within the scope of
Article 9, from which they should be excluded. The Massachusetts
bill is of great, interest in its recognition of the incompleteness of the
treatment of intangible property by the official draft of the Code. How-
ever, it is to be hoped that the Pennsylvania legislature will find some
more satisfactory solution to the problems which have been discussed.
CONCLUSION
These recommendations are not intended to detract from the merits
of Article 9 of the Code. Article 9 represents a forward step in the
law of security, and its benefits outweigh the imperfections which have
so far been discovered. It is not to be wondered that such a compre-
hensive revision of the law should fail to cover, or should cover in a
less desirable way, a few of the transactions with which it purports to
deal; or that a group of students of the Code, who had little or no con-
nection with its original drafting, should find matters in it that they
would like to change. It is believed that the Code can be improved
not only in the foregoing respects but in certain others, and that as time
goes on new areas of improvement will reveal themselves. The
sponsors of the Code have shown an open-minded willingness to con-
sider such suggestions as have already been made and it may be con-
fidently expected that this attitude will continue. It is therefore to be
hoped that by the winter of 1955 the points discussed in this Article,
and other matters which may come to the attention of students of the
Code, will be dealt with by the legislature, in order that the Code may
provide an even better system for dealing with secured transactions.
